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T
here is little doubt that we are witnessing a technological revolution.
The question is, does this technological revolution have revolution-
ary economic consequences? In particular, is economic productivity
growing at a much faster rate today, and if so, will it continue to do so in
the future? In this article, we review recent literature on the measurement of
productivity growth in the United States. We ﬁnd considerable evidence that
the internet technology (IT) revolution has had an impact on productivity.
In order to understand the effects of IT on today’s economy, one should
look at the past century. When we consider postwar U.S. productivity move-
ments, two events stand out: the impressive productivity growth performance
from the end of World War II up to the early seventies, and the ensuing pro-
ductivity slowdown, which lasted until the mid-nineties. Labor productivity
growth, which averaged about 2 percent per year from the ﬁfties on, suddenly
decreased to nearly 0 percent, and then seemed to settle at a rate around 1
percent. Moreover, this postwar productivity pattern is observed not only for
the U.S. but throughout the western world.
Thisproductivityslowdownremainsquitepoorlyunderstood(foranover-
view and detailed data, see Hornstein and Krusell [1996]). One interpretation
of the productivity data is that the fast postwar growth was a transitional
period that made up for the losses during the Great Depression, and the post-
1974 period of low productivity growth rates is really the normal state of the
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economy. Wearenotconvincedthatthisviewiscorrect. Fromourperspective,
the productivity slowdown is interesting because it occurred at the same time
that IT applications became more widespread in the economy. The paradox
is that new technology developments since that time have been associated
with a productivity slowdown, and not an upturn, at least until quite recently.
In other words, economists have had legitimate reasons to challenge those
talking about a technology revolution on economic grounds: for it to have
hadsigniﬁcance, productivitygrowth(oreconomicwelfaremeasuredinsome
other way) ought to have gone up.
This article points to a number of reasons why the technology revolution
may have had a signiﬁcant impact on the economy’s production structure de-
spite its apparent insigniﬁcance in aggregate productivity statistics. First, we
emphasize a number of methodological issues that may have prevented stan-
dard accounting procedures from detecting increases in productivity. Second,
we take the view that the technology revolution may have affected the pro-
duction structure in a quite asymmetric form, mainly showing its economic
impact through changes in relative prices. Given this view, we investigate the
hypothesis that the technology revolution, after all, has had important con-
sequences on productivity: (1) it has led to radical changes in productivity
among different sectors/factors of production; and (2) a number of factors
related to the technology developments themselves have resulted in measures
of aggregate performance that do not accurately reﬂect the (positive) effects
on the economy. We ﬁnd that while there is some support for this hypothesis,
the evidence is not conclusive.
InSection1wereviewrecentmethodologicalandmeasurementadvances
in standard growth accounting, also known as “total factor productivity” ac-
counting, which uses some basic economic theory to account for changes in
productivity. The central question is the extent to which we have been, and
are still, witnessing a technology revolution that has a large impact on the
productivity of our economies. The IT boom has radical implications not
just as an example of rapid structural change, but also from a measurement
perspective. In particular, it seems to have brought about, and promises to
bring many more, large changes in a range of products used as both inputs
and outputs. Existing measurement methods may quickly become obsolete as
productschangeandnewproductsareintroduced, andsubstantialworktoim-
provethesemethods, boththeoreticallyandwithnewformsofdatacollection,
becomes of ﬁrst-order importance. An increasingly large part of the output
of our economy now has a quality-improvement aspect to it that is nontrivial
to capture quantitatively. Quality mismeasurement is a long recognized prob-
lem, especially in the service sector (where output is often measured directly
by input), and we can learn from attempts by economists to deal with this
sector. In this article we discuss—at a broad level—what the main problems
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most recent estimates of aggregate productivity change for the United States
using improved methods.
In Section 2 we review some recent literature on factor-speciﬁc produc-
tivity (FSP) accounting. The FSP approach imposes additional theoretical
structure on the measurement of productivity and attempts a more detailed
account of the sources of the productivity change. The motivation for moving
fromTFPtoFSPmeasurementisbasedonthelargechangesinvariousrelative
prices that we have observed during the past few decades. First, equipment
prices have fallen at a rapid rate; the seminal work by Gordon (1990) doc-
uments these developments in detail, based on careful quality measures of a
large range of durable goods. Second, relative prices of skilled and unskilled
labor have gone through large swings, most recently with a large increase in
the relative wage of educated workers. These relative price changes suggest
that there are factor-speciﬁc productivity changes. More theory is needed—
that is, more assumptions need to be made—in order to gain more precise
insights into the nature of the technology changes. We therefore spend time
developingsometheorynecessarytoshedlightontheseissuesonaconceptual
level, before discussing some recent practical applications.
1. TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Concept
Standard economic theory views production as the transformation of a collec-
tion of inputs into outputs. We are interested in how this production structure
is changing over time. In this section we derive the basic concepts used in
productivity accounting.
We keep things simple and assume that there is one output, y, and two
inputs, capital k and labor n. The production structure is represented by the
production function, F: y = F (k,n,t). Since the production structure may
change, the production function is indexed by time t. Productivity changes
when the production function shifts over time, i.e., there is a change in output
that we cannot attribute to changes in inputs. More formally, the marginal
change in output is the sum of the marginal changes in inputs, weighted by
their marginal contributions to output (marginal products), and the shift of the
production function ˙ y = Fk˙ k +Fn˙ n+Ft.1 This is usually expressed in terms
of growth rates as
ˆ y = ηkˆ k + ηnˆ n +ˆ z, with ˆ z = Ft/F,
1 The marginal change of a variable is its instantaneous rate of change over time; that is,
if we write the value of a variable at a point in time as x (t), then the marginal change is the
time derivative ˙ x (t) = ∂x(t)/∂t. Nothing is lost in the following if the reader interprets ˙ x (t) as
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where hats denote growth rates and the weight on an input growth rate is the
elasticity of output with respect to the input: ηk = Fkk/F and ηn = Fnn/F.
Alternatively, if we know the elasticities we can derive productivity growth
as output growth minus a weighted sum of input growth rates. Indeed, it was
Solow’s (1957) important insight that under two assumptions we can replace
an input’s output elasticity, which we do not observe, with the input’s share
in total revenue, which we do. First, we assume that production is constant
returns to scale, i.e., if we double all inputs, then output will double. This
implies that the output elasticities sum to one: ηk + ηn = 1. Second, we
assumethatproducersactcompetitivelyintheiroutputandinputmarkets, i.e.,
they take the prices of their products and inputs as given. Proﬁt maximization
then implies that inputs are employed until the marginal revenue product of
an input is equal to the price of that input. In turn, this implies that the output
elasticity of an input is equal to the input’s revenue share. For example, for
the employment of labor, proﬁt maximization implies that pyFn = pn, which
can be rewritten as ηn = Fnn/F = pnn/pyy = αn (pi stands for the price of
good i). With these two assumptions we can calculate productivity growth,
also known as total factor productivity (TFP) growth, as
ˆ z =ˆ y − (1 − αn) ˆ k − αnˆ n.
Implementation of the Solow growth accounting procedure thus requires reli-
ableinformationonthepricesandquantitiesofinputsandoutputs. Wediscuss
below some of the issues that arise in productivity accounting and how they
are affected by the current advances in information technologies.
Implementation and Weaknesses
In this section we discuss issues of aggregation, changes of quality versus
quantity, missing inputs, and available observations on prices. Finally, we
brieﬂy discuss the underlying assumptions of constant returns to scale and
perfect competition.
Aggregation
Any modern economy produces a large variety of commodities and uses an
equallylargevarietyofcommoditiesasinputsinproduction. Inordertomake
useful statements on the overall performance of the economy, we have to
deﬁne broad commodity aggregates. The theoretically preferred aggregation
procedure is the construction of Divisia indexes (see, for example, Jorgenson,
Gollop, and Fraumeni [1987] or Hulten [1973]).2 In practice we approximate
a Divisia index with a chain-linked price and quantity index.
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As an example, consider the production structure described above, but
assume that there are two types of labor: unskilled labor nu and skilled labor
ns, which trade at prices wu and ws. Suppose that skilled and unskilled labor
combine and generate the labor aggregate n = G(nu,n s). The aggregator
function G is constant returns to scale. Using the same arguments as above
for the Solow growth accounting procedure, we can write aggregate labor
growthasacost-share-weightedsumoftheskilledandunskilledlaborgrowth
rates
ˆ n = ωuˆ nu + ωs ˆ ns,
where ωu = wunu/(wunu + wsns) and ωs = wsns/(wunu + wsns). Notice
that the aggregator function is time invariant, i.e., the productivity of skilled
and unskilled labor does not change over time. Essentially, this is an iden-
tiﬁcation assumption: given our assumptions we can only make statements
about aggregate productivity, not about factor-speciﬁc productivity. We will
return to this issue below. In general, if we have prices and quantities for a
collection of commodities {(pi,q i) : i = 1,...,m} we assume that there is a
constant returns-to-scale aggregator function ¯ q = Q(q1,...,q m), and deﬁne
the growth rate of the aggregate quantity index as
 ¯ q =
m 
i=1
piqi
¯ p¯ q
ˆ qi with ¯ p¯ q =
m 
i=1
piqi
and ¯ p is the implicit aggregate price index. The expression for the growth rate
of aggregate output is also the deﬁnition of the Divisia quantity index for this
particular collection of commodities.
The level of aggregation depends on the focus of the research. Recent
research on the effects of IT has tried to establish how much of output growth
canbeattributedtoITcapitalaccumulationandifthespreadofIThasaffected
TFP growth in various industries differentially. For this purpose, researchers
have constructed separate aggregates for IT related capital, such as comput-
ing and communications equipment and other capital goods. In this context,
Divisiaindexeshavethenicepropertythattheyaggregateconsistently. There-
fore, we can ﬁrst construct industryTFP growth from industry output, capital,
and labor growth, then use the industry data to construct aggregate output,
capital, and labor growth, and ﬁnally obtain aggregate TFP growth, which is
also a weighted sum of industry productivity growth rates (see Jorgenson et
al. [1987]).
Price, Quantity, and Quality
Until now we have worked according to the assumption that it is easy to
obtain prices and quantities for any particular commodity. Yet the commodity
structure of an industrial economy is not static: existing commodities are
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between improvement and replacement is just a matter of degree, and it is
more useful to think of products as having certain quality properties that are
relevant to the purpose for which the commodity is used, be it in consumption
or production. For example, the average car today is very different from
the same car 20 years ago in terms of its performance characteristics, its
maintenance requirements, etc. One way to measure the car production in the
economy would simply be to count the number of units produced, but this
method clearly does not reﬂect the superior quality of today’s car relative to
yesterday’s car, and it would lead one to underestimate output growth and
thereby productivity growth. The appropriate procedure is then to adjust a car
for its quality content, i.e., a car is weighted according to its characteristics.
Not accounting for quality change in the production of cars would lead one to
underestimate output and productivity growth.
Whencommoditiesdifferaccordingtoquality,wehavetoconstructquality-
adjusted price measures. In order to see if a broadly deﬁned commodity has
become expensive over time, we do not compare the price of two similar
commodities at different points in time, but we compare the quality-adjusted
prices. Only an increase in the quality-adjusted price represents a true price
increase. The use of quality-adjusted prices, or hedonic prices, was pioneered
by Griliches (1961). Gordon’s (1990) work on durable goods shows that the
relative price of durable goods declines at a substantially faster rate once one
accounts for quality change.
The counterpart of this observation is that, using Gordon’s (1990) price
deﬂator, the quantity of durable goods produced increases at a faster rate.
For the case of investment goods, disregarding quality change leads one not
only to underestimate output growth, but also to underestimate input growth
becauseinvestmentisusedtoconstructcapitalstocks. Theeffectonmeasured
productivitygrowthcanbeambiguoussinceweunderestimatebothoutputand
input growth. Obviously, adjusting for quality change is more important for
new products in innovative industries such as IT. Recently this approach has
been successfully applied to the construction of computer price indexes in the
UnitedStates(seeColeetal.[1986]). Thisapplicationwassuccessfulbecause
there was a well-deﬁned and easily measured set of characteristics describing
the performance of computers.
When it is difﬁcult to apply hedonic pricing—e.g., when it is impractical
or conceptually hard to distinguish products’ characteristics—there can be
other ways to make quality adjustments. In a recent innovative paper by Bils
and Klenow (1999), one such method is developed and put to work. Loosely
speaking,thealternativetobrute-forcemeasurementofqualitycomponentsof
productsproposedbyBilsandKlenowistousetheory. Consider,forinstance,
vacuumcleaners. Mosthouseholdsownone. However,therearemanybrands
and qualities of vacuum cleaners, and by looking at detailed household data
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translates into a more expensive vacuum cleaner. After using the cross section
to ﬁnd out how income translates into quality, Bils and Klenow (1999) turn
to the time series and use aggregate changes in household income to predict
the added quality component in vacuum cleaner purchases over time. This
methodisappliedtoabroadsetofproducts,andtheresultscanbesummarized
in a downward revision of the growth of the ofﬁcial Bureau of Labor Statistics
price index by over 2 percentage points per annum (with a corresponding
upward revision in real output growth).
The problems of quality adjustment are well recognized but hard to re-
solve. With the explosion of new IT-related products, quality mismeasure-
ments are likely to be more severe. Fortunately, IT advances are likely to
ease data collection in the future, but the brute-force method surely needs to
be complemented with alternative methods, such as that of Bils and Klenow
(1999).
Intheservicesector,afailuretoaccountforchangesinqualitymayexplain
the poor productivity performance in a variety of industries. A prominent
example in the United States is the banking sector, where until recently bank
output was extrapolated based on bank employment. As heavy users of IT,
the ﬁnancial industries have substituted equipment capital for labor. Given
the measurement procedure, the capital-labor substitution had the unfortunate
consequence of lowering measured output while maintaining or increasing
the use of inputs. An incorrect measure of output thus results in apparent
productivitydeclines. Recentrevisionsdeﬁnebankoutputasanemployment-
weightedsumofthenumberofdifferenttransactionsperformed(seeMoulton
[2000]). However, this still does not correct for changes in the quality of
transactions, such as convenience, reliability, and speed. One might expect
that future IT developments will allow for further improvements along these
quality dimensions.
Anothersectorwhosecontributiontotheaggregateeconomyhasincreased
andwherequalityaspectsareveryimportantistheprovisionofhealthservices.
For this sector one would have to construct medical diagnosis price indexes
that would account for the accuracy of the diagnosis and the inconvenience
to the patient, as well as treatment price indexes that would account for the
success rate, intrusiveness, side effects, etc. of the treatment (see Shapiro,
Shapiro, and Wilcox [1999]).
Finally, to our knowledge, all productivity accounting exercises assume
that the quality of different types of labor remains constant over time. That
is, the overall quality of the aggregate labor force may increase because the
economy employs more skilled than unskilled labor, but the quality of skilled
and unskilled labor is assumed to remain the same. We return to this issue in
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Missing Inputs and Outputs
Closely related to the measurement of quality is the problem of missing in-
puts and outputs, which can bias measured rates of productivity growth. This
problem is evident in the treatment of expenditures on Research and Develop-
ment (R&D) and software and in the construction of capital stock series from
investment and depreciation.
Progress can be made toward solving the problem of missing inputs and
outputs. The recent National Income and ProductAccount (NIPA) revision in
the United States now includes one previously missing capital input, namely
computersoftware(seeMoulton,Parker,andSeskin[1999]). BeforetheNIPA
revision,softwarewasnottreatedasaninvestmentgood,butasanintermediate
good; it therefore did not add to ﬁnal demand. The inclusion of software
investment has contributed about 0.2 percentage points to total U.S. GDP
growth from the early 1990s on (see Seskin [1999]).3 Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000) ﬁnd that software investment contributes about 5 percent to output
growth and that software capital makes up about one-ninth of total capital
accumulation. It is not clear if R&D spending should be treated the same
way as spending on software. Since R&D spending generates knowledge,
similar to “organizational” capital acquired by ﬁrms when they learn how to
use new IT, one could interpret this knowledge capital as a missing input.
On the other hand, these inputs—knowledge and organizational capital—are
not traded commodities so their accumulation might as well be captured as
productivity improvements.
Related to the question of missing inputs and outputs are Kiley’s (1999)
and Whelan’s (2000) discussions of capital stock measurement. Research
has shown that the perpetual inventory model with geometric depreciation
is a reasonable approximation to observed depreciation patterns for durable
goods. If the depreciation rate, δ, of a class of durable goods is constant over
time, then the net increase of the capital stock, k, is investment, x, minus
depreciation, δk:
˙ k = x − δk.
Kiley (1999) argues that for high rates of capital accumulation, such as those
observed for IT over the last 20 years, observed investment expenditures do
not capture all resource costs associated with capital accumulation. Resource
costs that are incurred in the process of new capital formation and are in ad-
dition to the observed investment expenditures are called “adjustment costs.”
Adjustment costs can affect productivity measurement in two ways. On the
3 The 1999 NIA revisions increased real GDP by about 0.4 percentage points for the period
1992–1998. Revised price index numbers contributed about 0.1 percentage points. The remaining
increase was mainly due to the revised treatment of software expenditures, but also reﬂects the
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onehand, thepresenceofadjustmentcostscouldmeanthatstandardmeasures
of output underestimate true output because they are net of adjustment costs.
On the other hand, we could say that standard procedures overestimate true
capital accumulation because the marginal product of investment in the pro-
duction of capital goods is not constant at one, but declining. Whelan (2000)
argues that for computers, current procedures overestimate depreciation rates
because they confuse physical depreciation—which lowers the effective cap-
ital stock—with economic depreciation, which does not affect the effective
capital stock.4
Finally, we want to raise the perennial favorite issue of market versus
nonmarket transactions, or how to value household production. One of the
presumed improvements generated by the Internet is the additional conve-
nience it provides to consumers: the Net makes product search and price
comparisons easier, provides access to certain services, and reduces overall
thetimehouseholdshavetospendontransactions. Whileonecaninterpretthis
problem as one of missing inputs and outputs, to us it appears to be a quality
measurement problem. From the point of view of the household, transactions
have certain characteristics, and a commodity or service obtained through the
Net has different characteristics than the same commodity or service obtained
in a store. Very little work has been done to date to assess the value of these
changes in characteristics.
Input Cost Shares
For the Solow growth accounting, we identify an input’s output elasticity with
the input’s revenue share. We therefore need measures of the prices or rental
rates of all inputs. This measurement is apparently not a problem for the
calculation of aggregate productivity growth, for we have data on payments
to labor and can treat payments to capital as the residual. There is an issue,
4 Usually the depreciation rate for a particular type of capital good is estimated from a cross
section of quality-adjusted used capital goods prices. Older capital goods are less efﬁcient due to
depreciation, and this is reﬂected in their lower prices. Assuming geometric depreciation, the slope
of the age-price line for the different vintages of used capital goods reﬂects the depreciation rate.
Suppose in addition not only that capital goods depreciate, but that their lifetime is ﬁnite because at
some age it is no longer proﬁtable to operate a capital good (economic depreciation). In this case
the slope of the age-price line also incorporates the effects of a declining remaining service life
for the capital good. For capital goods with long service lives this effect is not very important,
but for computers, which currently have quite short service lives, this effect may dominate the
physical depreciation.
Whelan (2000) suggests that for computer equipment, current procedures identify all of the
slope of the price-age line with physical depreciation, even though most of it is due to a ﬁnite
service life. If this is true, then this procedure may underestimate the computer capital stock
during the early phase of computer capital accumulation because it depreciates computer capital
too fast. On the other hand, this procedure also assumes that capital is around for a much longer
time period than the actual service life of capital, that is, it overestimates the capital stock in the
later phase of computer capital accumulation. One would expect that after some time, these two
effects would balance and the measured capital stock would be about right.58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
however, about how to allocate proprietor’s income; part of it is payment
for labor services and part represents capital income, but this issue appears
to be minor. Our problem is not completely solved, however, since we still
have to construct aggregate capital and labor series. If we deﬁne aggregate
capital and labor as an equally weighted sum of the different types of capital
and labor in the economy, we are done. These measures of capital and labor,
however,arenotthetheoreticallypreferredDivisiaindexesasdiscussedabove,
and for the construction of a Divisia index we need to know the amount of
the payment made to each component of the index, not just the sum of all
payments. This requirement creates a problem for the construction of capital
aggregates: Because capital is usually owned by producers, the services of
capital are not traded on spot markets, and we therefore have no observations
on rental rates for different types of capital. The usual procedure is to make
an assumption on the rate of return on capital and then calculate the rental
rate of capital implied by an asset pricing equation (see Jorgenson, Gollop,
and Fraumeni [1987]). The asset pricing relationships are derived under the
assumption that there is no uncertainty, which is not an innocuous assumption
if one believes that the economy can experience a technological revolution.
During a revolutionary period, one would expect that ﬁrst, overall uncertainty
would increase, and second, that not all types of capital would be equally
affected by the increased uncertainty.
Solow’s Assumptions
LetusnowconsiderthetwotheoreticalassumptionsunderlyingSolowgrowth
accounting: production is constant returns to scale and producers are compet-
itive. In the context of business cycles analysis, it has been argued that Solow
growth accounting systematically mismeasures true changes in productivity
because the underlying assumptions do not hold, namely that there are in-
creasing returns to scale and that producers do not equate price to marginal
cost (see Hall [1988]). Extensive research in this area has not completely
resolved all issues, but it is apparent that constant returns to scale and compe-
tition are reasonable approximations (Basu and Fernald 1999). A remaining
problem for short-run productivity accounting appears to be a missing input:
unobserved factor utilization, which is essentially a theoretical construct and
is very difﬁcult to measure. We do not expect this problem to affect medium-
to long-term growth accounting since theory suggests that there is no trend
growth to this particular activity.
We usually attribute changes in TFP to technological improvements, but
clearly TFP also reﬂects the effects of government regulations, market struc-
tures, ﬁrm organization, prevailing work rules, etc. In a nice case study,
Schmitz (1998) describes how in the 1980s changing competitive pressures
on the U.S. and Canadian iron-ore mining industry induced mines to change
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changing their technology. Standard Solow growth accounting registers the
change in TFP, but it does not explain why it occurs. It is probably also true
that productivity changes of this variety will result in one-time improvements,
and cannot account for sustained productivity growth. Nevertheless, an ex-
planation of this observation would be useful because many discussions of
IT suggest that it makes the environment more competitive and induces ﬁrms
to respond with technological and organizational improvements. A possible
explanationmightbebasedonaframeworkwhere(1)managers, workers, and
capital owners somehow share the surplus from operating a ﬁrm, (2) the rela-
tive surplus shares depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the different
parties, and (3) changes in competitive pressures have a differential impact on
the parties’ bargaining positions. This framework would represent a radical
departure from the standard Solow growth accounting assumptions.
Recent Evidence on IT and Productivity Growth
We now review the most recent work on IT and aggregate productivity growth
using standard Solow growth accounting. The papers of Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000), Whelan (2000), and Kiley (1999) focus
on the contribution of IT capital to aggregate output growth and changes in
aggregate productivity growth rates during the 1990s. There are some differ-
ences in the studies’ particular deﬁnitions of IT capital, but the studies share
the conclusion that in the 1990s the contribution of IT capital accumulation to
outputgrowthincreasedandproductivitygrowthincreased. Hall(1999,2000)
proposesamethodformeasuringunobservedcapitalaccumulationassociated
with the diffusion of IT and studies the implications for TFP growth.
Aggregate TFP
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) identify IT capital with computer hardware and
software and with communications equipment. They ﬁnd that from 1973–
1990 to 1995–1998, the contribution of IT to aggregate growth doubles and
productivity growth triples. For the earlier time period, IT investment ac-
counted for one-tenth of output growth, and IT capital accumulation made
up one-ﬁfth of total capital accumulation and about one-tenth of total output
growth. In the more recent period, IT investment accounts for about one-ﬁfth
ofoutputgrowth,andITcapitalaccumulationmakesuptwo-ﬁfthsoftotalcap-
italaccumulationandaboutone-ﬁfthoftotaloutputgrowth. Atthesametime,
productivity growth increases from an annual rate of 0.3 percent to 1 percent,
a rate that is about as high as the golden era of the 1950s and 1960s. Oliner
and Sichel (2000), using the same deﬁnition of IT capital and a somewhat
narrower deﬁnition of output, ﬁnd a similar increase in productivity growth
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ﬁnd the increase in productivity growth rates to be limited to the post-1995
period.
Whelan (2000) identiﬁes IT with computing equipment and argues that
standardmeasuresofdepreciationoverestimatethephysicaldepreciationrates
of computing equipment. His estimates of computing equipment stocks in
1998 exceed standard values by almost 50 percent, which would indicate an
enormous measurement error. The implied faster growth rates and higher
revenue shares for computing equipment double the contribution of IT capital
accumulation to output growth. Since aggregate output growth is not affected
by the redeﬁnition of depreciation rates, the higher contribution of IT capital
accumulation is offset by a corresponding decline in the contribution of other
capital and overall TFP growth.
In sum, the most recent studies ﬁnd important productivity improvements
for the very last part of the 1990s, but the productivity slowdown still appears
to be a mystery. It is possible that the productivity slowdown may simply be
indicative of structural change and that an increasing share of the economy is
badly mismeasured. This hypothesis is discussed in some detail in Hornstein
and Krusell (1996), although the main conclusion from that work—and any
other work we are aware of—is that there is suggestive but not much hard
evidence at this point that would allow us to reassess the 1973–1995 period.
Structuralchangecanhaveimportantimplicationsineconomieswithanumber
of adjustment costs in the form of learning, reorganization, etc., and we have
noted the mismeasured quality problem in our discussion of methods.
In this context, Kiley (1999) also identiﬁes IT with computing equip-
ment and performs a growth accounting exercise that allows for adjustment
costs to capital accumulation.5 He ﬁnds that in the 1970s and 1980s high
IT capital accumulation rates actually reduced observed net-output growth.
Unlike other studies, which use standard Solow growth accounting, he ﬁnds
that aggregate productivity growth has remained constant from the 1970s to
the 1990s. Adjustment costs are a theoretical concept used to motivate why
short-runmovementsininvestmentarelessvolatilethanpredictedbythestan-
dardgrowthmodel; itisverydifﬁculttoobtaindirectevidenceonthem. Since
adjustment costs are used to study short-run dynamics, they are usually nor-
malizedsuchthattheyarezerowhentheinvestment-capitalstockratioisatits
long-run average. The available evidence on adjustment costs seems to relate
to local deviations from long-run averages. Obviously, for a new product like
IT, the investment-capital stock ratio will be very different from its long-run
value, which means that adjustment costs might be substantial and can have a
5 Solow growth accounting is based on standard economic theory, as represented by the
growth model, and it does not include adjustments costs. The introduction of adjustment costs
forces Kiley (1999) to deviate from the usual nonparametric Solow growth accounting procedure:
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measurable impact on net-output growth. On the other hand, we do not know
ifthelocalpropertiesofadjustmentcostsapplywheninvestment-capitalstock
ratios are far from their long-run averages.
Finally, Hall(1999, 2000)—oreHall, accordingtohislatestpaper—starts
out with the assumption that in the 1990s the spread of IT was associated with
theaccumulationofanewtypeofcapital,e-capitalforshort,andthate-capital
is not measured by standard National Income and Product Accounting. This
assumption reﬂects the observation that the market value of private corpora-
tions relative to the replacement cost of their physical capital increased from a
factor of one at the beginning of the 1990s to a factor of three at the end of the
1990s. eHallextendsthestandardgrowthaccountingframeworkandassumes
thatmeasuredoutputisproducedwithphysicalcapital,e-capital,skilledlabor,
andunskilledlaborandthatnewe-capitalisaccumulatedthroughtheemploy-
ment of skilled labor.6 Using data on the market value of ﬁrms in addition
to the usual series on quantities and factor rental rates employed in growth
accounting, he constructs a series for e-capital. He ﬁnds that with e-capital,
the contribution of other inputs and TFP to output growth is substantially re-
duced: without e-capital, TFP accounts for two-ﬁfths of total output growth;
with e-capital the combined contribution of e-capital and TFP accounts for
three-fourths of total output growth, and most of it is due to e-capital. eHall’s
approachhastheundesirablepropertythatlargestockmarketreevaluationsim-
ply the creation/destruction of large amounts of e-capital, since equity makes
up a large portion of the market value of ﬁrms. This property does not ﬁt well
with our understanding of capital as a durable good. We can account for large
equity market reevaluations if we assume that a substantial fraction of a ﬁrm’s
assets are indeed not reproducible, but that market values reﬂect current and
future production opportunities. This is an important point to consider in an
environment where new technologies change the way we see the future.
Disaggregated TFP
Finally, we may want to know where technical change takes place. Is it
concentrated in particular industries, or do we see a general increase in TFP
for all industries? Is industry TFP growth related to the use of IT? Evidence
on these points is mixed.
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) report TFP growth rates for a range of two-
digitindustries. TheyﬁndthatTFPgrowthvarieswidely: thebest-performing
industries include Trade, Electronic and Electric Equipment, Agriculture,
Industry Machinery and Equipment, Transport and Warehouse; the worst-
6 eHall also relates the interaction of e-capital and skilled and unskilled labor to the idea
of skill-biased technical change. We discuss this issue in the sections on multifactor productivity
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performing industries with negative TFP growth are Services and Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE). Two observations are applicable. First,
the results concerning the relative ranking of industries and the fact that large
parts of the economy (FIRE, Services) show negative TFP growth rates are
similar to those of previous studies, i.e., accounting for IT has apparently not
had an impact.7 Second, the impact of IT on particular industries appears to
be mixed. Given the advantages IT provides to inventory control and produc-
tion planning, industries such as Trade and Transportation and Warehousing
should have beneﬁted from the diffusion of IT. On the other hand, although a
substantial fraction of IT investment is going to Services and FIRE, the pro-
ductivity performance of these industries has not improved at all. Above, we
have suggested that for these industries IT diffusion may simply worsen the
output measurement problem.
More speciﬁcally related to the production of computing equipment is
Oliner and Sichel (2000), who use changes in the relative price of comput-
ers and semiconductors to evaluate the contribution of the sector producing
computing equipment to aggregate TFP growth.8 They ﬁnd that despite the
relatively small revenue share of the computing equipment sector, that sector
accounts for about half of total TFP growth.
Microstudies
We have noted that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd any clear relationship between the
utilization of IT and the resulting TFP growth at the industry level. However,
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000a) argue that more evidence on the impact of IT
applications on productivity is available for ﬁrm level data. Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2000b) estimate the impact of computing equipment on TFP growth
at the ﬁrm level using a variation of Solow growth accounting. Essentially
they argue that TFP growth at the ﬁrm level is positively correlated with the
growth of computer capital in the ﬁrm. They also suggest that the beneﬁts
from investment in computer capital are delayed, which can be interpreted as
being due to needing to learn to use IT or to the accumulation of IT-related
organizational capital.
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (1999) study the interaction of IT cap-
ital accumulation, ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital accumulation, and organiza-
tional change at the ﬁrm level. They use survey data on ﬁrms to construct an
index of human capital (average education levels, skill levels as perceived by
management, and occupational mix), an index of human capital investment
(training and screening activities), and an index of how “decentralized” the
7 Unfortunately, Jorgenson and Stiroh have not yet calculated industry TFP numbers for post-
1995.
8 See also our discussion of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) in the next section.A. Hornstein, P. Krusell: IT Revolution 63
ﬁrm’s organizational structure is (measures of team orientation). They ﬁnd
that their measures of IT capital, human capital, and work organization are
all positively correlated. In particular, (1) ﬁrms that have a better educated
work force and a more decentralized work organization tend to use more IT
capital, and (2) ﬁrms that use more IT capital tend to spend more on training
their work force.
Finally,BrynjolfssonandYang(1999)studytherelationbetweenthestock
of computer capital in a ﬁrm and the market value of that ﬁrm. They argue
that one dollar of computer capital in the ﬁrm raises the market value of a
ﬁrm by more than one dollar. They suggest that this markup reﬂects other
“unmeasured” capital which is complementary to computer capital. In this
contexttheypointoutthatwhenaﬁrmimplementsanewinformationmanage-
ment system, the biggest cost component is consulting, training, and software
development, not hardware expenditures.9
2. FACTOR-SPECIFIC PRODUCTIVITY
At times of signiﬁcant technological change, the relative importance of differ-
ent inputs, or factors of production, may change substantially because of spe-
ciﬁctechnologicalinnovations. Forexample, duringthelast30yearswehave
witnessed striking changes in the relative prices of new equipment capital and
in the premiums paid to highly educated workers (skilled workers for short).
These changes likely reﬂect factor-speciﬁc technology movements, that is,
technologicaladvancesthathaveenabledsomefactorstoenjoylargeincreases
in marginal productivity while others have seen none or have decreased. In
other words, factor-speciﬁc productivity measurements may capture the eco-
nomicsignsofatechnologicalrevolutionevenwhenTFPmeasurementsshow
tranquility. The increased productivity of one factor may lead to changes in
the provision of factors—by changing the amount of hours worked of differ-
ent kinds of labor or by causing changes in the accumulation of physical and
human capital—in such a way that TFP does not change much.
This hypothesis has been described and compared to past technology rev-
olutions, such as the introduction of electricity in the beginning of the 20th
century, in Greenwood andYorukoglu (1997). In this article, we only discuss
this possibility on a broad level; future work will explore it in more detail. We
point out the advantage of these multidimensional productivity measures, and
we underline their shortcomings. We also present some recent examples of
empirical work aimed at factor-speciﬁc productivity (FSP) measurement.
9 The recent reclassiﬁcation of software expenditures as investment should ameliorate this
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Introducing Factor-Speciﬁc Productivity
Solowian productivity accounting shows how the productivity of all inputs
changes while it imposes a minimal amount of theoretical structure. Factor-
speciﬁc productivity accounting imposes more theoretical structure than the
Solowian method does, but also allows us to evaluate productivity changes
for individual inputs. Factor-speciﬁc productivity accounting recognizes that
TFP growth may not be exogenous, but in fact can depend on the relative use
of different inputs. This recognition has important consequences for policy
evaluation. For example, whether or not government taxes or subsidizes the
accumulation of equipment capital affects capital stock accumulation, which
in turn may affect measured TFP growth. In order to evaluate the effect of a
tax or subsidy on equipment investment, one would need to know more about
the nature of the productivity improvements. In particular, it may be that
technological change interacts asymmetrically with different inputs and that
the effect of capital accumulation on TFP growth depends on the nature of
these interactions. We leave the discussion of policy and other counterfactual
experiments to a future paper. Here, we will show some useful ways of
allowingtechnologicalchangetointeractdifferentlywithdifferentinputs: we
will characterize productivity change multidimensionally.
To illustrate the difference between TFP growth and factor-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity growth, consider the basic neoclassical production structure with
output a function of capital and labor (see Section 1 above). Now impose
the additional assumption that output is a time-invariant function of efﬁciency
units of each input
y = F(A kk,Ann),
where k is the number of machines and Ak is a machine-speciﬁc productivity
factor that changes over time (and similarly for labor). The factor-speciﬁc
productivities are assumed to be exogenous. The marginal change in output
is ˙ y = F1( ˙ Akk + ˙ kAk)+F2( ˙ Ann+˙ nAn). Assuming constant returns to scale
and perfect competition we can write the growth rate of output as
ˆ y = (1 − αn)( ˆ Ak + ˆ k)+ αn( ˆ An +ˆ n),
where αn is the labor income share, and the components of TFP growth are
ˆ z = (1 − αn) ˆ Ak + αn ˆ An.
Since, with the exception of a Cobb-Douglas production function, the
labor income share depends on the input ratio, TFP growth will depend on
inputs. If the elasticity of substitution between inputs was greater than one,
thelaborincomesharewoulddecreasewithanincreaseinthestockofcapital.
In this case, we would expect that a subsidy to capital increases TFP growth
if and only if ˆ Ak > ˆ An. In addition, TFP growth is not a goal in itself. Rather,
a government’s objective might be a higher output growth rate, in which case
the relative importance of Ak and An clearly matters again.A. Hornstein, P. Krusell: IT Revolution 65
The disadvantage of factor-speciﬁc productivity accounting is that it im-
poses substantially more structure than the assumption of constant returns to
scale and marginal-product pricing, as is sufﬁcient for Solow’s TFP account-
ing.10 As we will discuss below, much more structure is typically needed
in order to draw inference about factor-speciﬁc productivity. The example
above assumes that the production technology is invariant over time with the
inputs measured in “efﬁciency units,” such that technological change can take
only the form of increases in the efﬁciency factors.11 The quantitative results
depend on the form of the F function (on the elasticity of factor substitution
especially).
Finally, we would like to address the potential quantitative importance
of considering FSP measures. One potential objection to FSP is based on
the observation that over the last century, aggregate labor and capital shares
have been remarkably stable in the United States. These stable factor shares
suggest that the aggregate production function for the United States is well
approximated by the Cobb-Douglas function with constant factor shares and
unitelasticityofsubstitution. ButwithunitelasticityFSPandTFPaccounting
are equivalent. There are several other observations, however, that indicate
substantial variation of factor income shares. First, stable shares are mainly
observed for the very broadest aggregates: labor versus capital. For break-
downs of the labor input—into different skill (educational) groups—shares
have had strong trends and swings around trend. For the capital income share,
there is information that for our object of interest—new equipment/IT-related
capital—the cost share has increased dramatically. Second, if one looks at
a cross section of countries, especially including countries at a lower level
of development, then one sees that there is variation in the labor share with
development; at the very least, countries do not seem to have the same labor
shares. Third, and on a related point, some developed countries have had
much larger swings in the aggregate shares than what has been observed in
the United States; one example is the dramatic increase of proﬁt shares in
France in the 1980s.
10 There is a sense in which factor-speciﬁc productivity (FSP) accounting imposes less struc-
ture than TFP accounting. In the example above we back out FSP for capital, given a functional
form for production. But FSP essentially represents a change in quality, and a more structured
procedure would try to obtain measures of quality, as discussed above for TFP.
11 There are alternative, tractable structural approaches to how technology changes over time.
For example, one could specify a CES function with elasticities changing exogenously over time.
More structurally still, Cordoba (2000) describes the sequential adoption of output technologies
with higher and higher capital shares. He then shows, with closed-form solutions, that this form
of “structural change” implies increases in the capital-output ratio while allowing the interest rate
to remain constant; these properties seem to well approximate the development path of many
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We now turn to factor-speciﬁc productivity measurement for the four fac-
tors mentioned most often: capital equipment and structures and skilled and
unskilled labor.
Investment-Speciﬁc Technological Change
The recent decades of technological change and the current focus on IT are
often described as examples of how technology is “embodied” in new equip-
ment. Theideaisthatproductivityimprovementsoccurinthesectorproducing
equipmentinvestment,andtheseproductivityimprovementsaretransmittedto
the rest of the economy through new equipment investment. Today’s higher
productivity in the investment-goods producing sector then effectively en-
hances the production possibilities for consumption in the future, through
increases in the capital stock. The embodiment question has a long history;
see, for example, Solow (1959) and Jorgenson (1966), as well as a recent
discussion and evaluation in Hercowitz (1998). Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (1997) argue that for the postwar United States, especially after the
1970s, most productivity growth was of the embodied variety.12
In its most basic version, capital-embodied technological change repre-
sents changes in factor-speciﬁc productivity: currently produced new capital
goods are relatively more productive than previously produced capital goods.
Ontheotherhand,oncewemeasurecapitalintermsofefﬁciencyunits,wecan
interpret capital-embodied technological change in terms of product-speciﬁc
changes in TFP, namely the productivity of the economy’s investment goods
sector relative to the consumption goods sector. We follow this second inter-
pretation,butwediscusscapital-embodiedtechnologicalchangeinthecurrent
section on changes in FSP, as opposed to in the previous section on changes
in TFP, because we impose considerably more theoretical structure when we
derive measures of capital-embodied technological changes.
We ﬁrst provide a general discussion of TFP accounting in a simple two-
sector model of the economy and how it relates to the usual measures of
aggregate TFP accounting. We follow this route in order to show how the
assumptions used by Greenwood et al. (1997) allow them to interpret their
results in terms of aggregate productivity in a one-sector economy. Finally,
we present Greenwood et al.’s (1997) results on the relative contributions of
sectoral TFP growth to aggregate growth.
Goods—consumptioncandnewcapitalx—areproducedusingthefactors
capital and labor as inputs to constant-returns-to-scale technologies
c = zcFc(kc,n c) and x = zxFx(kx,n x);
12 This ﬁnding relates to the observations by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and
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total factor inputs can be freely allocated across sectors,
kc + kx = k and nc + nx = n;
and investment is measured in efﬁciency units. The technologies may differ
acrosssectorsbecauseofdifferentfactorsubstitutionproperties(Fc maydiffer
fromFx),andtechnologicalimprovementsmayoccuratdifferentrates(zc may
grow at a different rate than does zx). We normalize productivity relative to
the consumption goods sector, zc = z and zx = qz, and q is the relative
productivity advantage of producing new capital goods. The evolution of the
capital stock is described by
˙ k (t) = x (t) − δk(t).
One could now proceed and calculate sector-speciﬁcTFP growth as described
in the previous section. Greenwood et al. (1997) choose an alternative route
and use this setup to calculate and interpret TFP growth within an aggregate
growth accounting framework.
In the ﬁrst section of the present article, we postulated—in accordance
with Solow’s assumptions—a measure y of aggregate output as equaling an
aggregate production function of capital, labor, and time. It was not made
explicit in that framework what output was made up of. In the one-sector
neoclassical growth model, aggregate output is by deﬁnition equal to the sum
of consumption and investment, y = c + x, but what is aggregate output in
a multisector economy, such as the two-sector model just described? Rather
than starting with an aggregate output concept, we will ﬁrst summarize the
production possibilities in the two-sector economy described above by the
transformation function G(c,x,k,n,t) = 0. The function G tells us what
combinations of consumption and investment goods c and x the economy can
produce, given its total factor inputs k and n. Since production is constant-
returns-to-scale, the transformation function is homogeneous of degree one in
outputs and inputs.
Following our discussion of Divisia indices in Section 1, we can deﬁne
an aggregate output index and a measure of aggregate TFP growth based on
this output measure:
ˆ yD ≡ scˆ c + (1 − sc)ˆ x and ˆ zD ≡ˆ yD − αˆ k − (1 − α)ˆ n.
The growth rate of the Divisia index of aggregate output is a weighted average
of the output growth rates in the two sectors, where the weights are the rev-
enue shares of consumption and investment, sc = pcc/(pcc + pxx).13 The
growth rate of aggregate TFP is then deﬁned analogously to the one-sector
economy as the difference between the aggregate output growth rate and the
weighted average of the aggregate input growth rates, where the weights are
the aggregate income shares of capital and labor, α = pkk/(pkk + pnn).
13 See our deﬁnition of Divisia indices in the section “Aggregation,” above.68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Divisiaindicesallowustoperformaggregateproductivityaccounting,but
there is no particular theoretical justiﬁcation suggesting that a Divisia index
is the unique aggregator function for the economy.14 In fact, one can show
that for multi-sector models there does not exist an output aggregator; that is,
in general no function exists that relates some measure of aggregate output to
measures of aggregate inputs (Hall 1973). However, let us now assume that
G is separable so that it is possible to ﬁnd an output aggregator:
G(c,x,k,n,t)= H(c,x,t)− F(k,n,t).
Here, we interpret F as the aggregate production function andH as the aggre-
gate output function, and both functions are homogeneous of degree one. In
particular, aggregate output is deﬁned as y = H(c,x,t)= F(k,n,t). Notice
that we must in general allow both of these functions to depend on time in
order to allow technological change of a general kind.
Now this setup can be specialized further to illustrate different kinds of
technological change: rather than allowing the variable t to have a general
inﬂuenceonH andF,considerinsteadF(zk,zl)andH(c,x/q), wherez and
q are time-dependent processes. That is, technological change is expressed
only through z and q, with z representing neutral technological change and
q investment-speciﬁc technological change.15 Can we obtain measures for
the two types of technological change for this aggregate speciﬁcation of the
economy? We might want to proceed as in the case of the Solow residual,
and deﬁne the productivity growth rates based on the equations which relate
output growth to input or expenditure growth rates
ˆ y = αˆ k + (1 − α) ˆ n +ˆ z = scˆ c + (1 − sc)

ˆ x −ˆ q

.
But here we face a problem: Although our theory suggests that there exists an
output aggregate, we do not have a measure of that output aggregate. In order
to construct the measure of aggregate output, we need to know the functional
form of H and F and the values of the productivity levels z and q. One
way to proceed is to assume that there is no investment-speciﬁc technological
change, that is, q is constant. With this assumption we have identiﬁed the
aggregate output index. In particular, the growth rate of aggregate output is
equal to the Divisia index growth rate ˆ yD deﬁned above. On the other hand,
wehavedeﬁnedourproblemaway: Therenolongerisanyinvestment-speciﬁc
technical change.16
14As stated in the ﬁrst section, Divisia indices have certain nice properties in terms of
aggregation (they are revenue-weighted sectorial indices, and this property applies to output, input,
and productivity indices), but this does not mean that they are in any sense the “true” aggregators
for an economy.
15 This is a slightly more general version of the model Greenwood et al. (1997) analyze
(they use speciﬁc functional forms for H and F), but cast in a one-sector form.
16An interesting question is, Is this model potentially consistent with the falling relative price
of investment? In principle the answer is “yes” because a falling relative price can be obtainedA. Hornstein, P. Krusell: IT Revolution 69
SinceGreenwoodetal.(1997)wanttostudytheroleofinvestment-speciﬁc
technological change, they have to make other assumptions in order to iden-
tify z and q. They assume that the factor substitution properties in the two
sectors of the economy are the same, that is, Fc = Fx = F. With this re-
striction one can show that H(c,x/q) = c + x/q, and that 1/q is the price
of investment goods relative to consumption goods. Greenwood et al. (1997)
can recover H by deﬂating nominal GDP with the consumption goods de-
ﬂator; that is, they deﬁne aggregate output in terms of consumption goods,
yGHK = [pcc + pxx]/pc = c + x/q. This is an unusual deﬁnition of aggre-
gate output—it does not coincide with the Divisia measure—but it is justiﬁed
within the conﬁnes of the model. In fact, it is rather natural given that con-
sumption is the ultimate source of welfare in the model.
Suppose we next calculate aggregate TFP based on this deﬁnition of ag-
gregate output; we would then obtain
ˆ zGHK =ˆ yGHK − αˆ k − (1 − α) ˆ n =ˆ z.
Greenwoodetal.’s(1997)deﬁnitionofTFPgrowthindeedrecoversexogenous
productivity changes that are not contaminated with the endogenous response
of the economy to these productivity changes. On the other hand, their def-
inition of aggregate TFP actually recovers productivity in the consumption
goodssectorandnotinthe“aggregateeconomy.” Giventheassumptionsthey
make, what does the aggregate TFP index based on the Divisia output index
recover? Using the deﬁnition of ˆ zD, we can show that
ˆ zD = scˆ z + (1 − sc)

ˆ z +ˆ q

.
That is, the Divisia-based residual is a revenue share-weighted aggregation of
the sector-speciﬁc residuals. Moreover, the relative importance of ˆ q for ˆ zD
is measured by (1 − sc)ˆ q/(

ˆ z + (1 − sc) ˆ q

. Note that the displayed Divisia
measure of aggregate TFP growth mixes the exogenous sectoral productivity
growth rates with the economy’s endogenous response to these growth rates
as reﬂected in the consumption and investment share.17
When Greenwood et al. (1997) implement their approach for the U.S.
economy, they use Robert Gordon’s (1990) quality adjustments to construct
the quality-adjusted inverse relative price of new investment goods 1/q. With
the quality-adjusted investment series they construct the capital stock, and
withSolowiangrowthaccountingmethodsfortheirconsumption-basedoutput
measure they construct a series for z. Their method implies a growth rate of
investment-speciﬁc technology of around 3 percent per annum, with growth
in neutral technology of around 1 percent per annum. Moreover, consistent
by appropriate assumptions on H. As the economy grows, the isoquants may signiﬁcantly change
shape so as to produce a continuous relative price change. Although this perspective seems rather
academic, it is a logical possibility.
17 In “Introducing Factor-Speciﬁc Productivity” we discussed why this might be undesirable.70 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
with the hypothesis of an equipment-led technology revolution, the growth
rate of the q series increased, already beginning in the mid-1970s, by about
half a percentage point. This ﬁnding is also consistent with McHugh and
Lane’s (1987) ﬁnding, based on cross-section evidence, that adjacent vintages
show signiﬁcantly smaller productivity differences prior to the mid-1970s.
Of course, neutral technology slowed down considerably at around the same
time—the TFP version of the productivity slowdown.18
Buildingonthismeasurement, Greenwoodetal.(1997)attribute, interms
of the model and as an entirely structural exercise, a substantial part of long-
term output growth to investment-speciﬁc technological change (growth in q)
rather than neutral technological change (growth in z).
How TechnologyAffects Skilled and Unskilled Labor
U.S. data over the last couple of decades reveal substantial changes in the
returns to education, the skilled wage premium. Moreover, typical wage re-
gressionsshowlargeincreasesinresidualvariance: wagevariancethatcannot
be attributed to observed characteristics such as age, experience, education,
race,orgender. KatzandMurphy(1992)andearlierobserversspeakof“skill-
biased technical change” as the explanatory factor behind these wage devel-
opments. Alternative explanations have been proposed, such as a decrease in
union activity and increased foreign competition for unskilled labor. Bound
and Johnson (1992), however, conclude that the lion’s share of the changes
in relative wages reﬂect relative changes in factor-speciﬁc productivity. In
a recent paper, Krusell, Ohanian, R´ ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) provide a
more structural explanation of the wage premium. They argue that it is not
factor-speciﬁc technological progress that increases the relative productivity
of skilled labor, but rather the rapid accumulation of equipment capital to-
gether with a skilled labor-capital complementarity that determines the wage
premium.
Skill-Biased Technological Change
Wewillnextdiscusshowfactor-speciﬁcproductivitymeasurementshavebeen
used to rationalize changes in the wage premium. Consider a production
function with capital and the two types of labor of the following kind:
y = F [k,G(Asns,A unu)],
where G is a CES function with substitution elasticity parameter ν and we
have abstracted from capital-speciﬁc productivity (alternatively, capital
18A very similar exercise is conducted in Gort, Greenwood, and Rupert (1999), where
quality-adjusted data are used not only for equipment but also for structures, thus identifying both
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embodies technological change and k is measured in efﬁciency units, as in
the previous section on investment-speciﬁc technological change). As above,
we assume that F and G are time-invariant, so that any technological change
comes through (As,A u). When the two types of labor are paid their marginal
products, the production structure implies that
log
ws
wu
=
ν − 1
ν
· log
As
Au
−
1
ν
· log
ns
nu
.
Katz and Murphy (1992) use this structure to interpret their leading ﬁnding
that in a regression of (the log of) relative wages on (the log of) relative factor
supplies and a time trend, using 1963–1987 aggregate U.S. annual data, one
obtains:
log
ws
wu
= 0.033 · t − 0.71 · log
ns
nu
.
KatzandMurphy(1992)concludefromthiswageregressionthat(1)theinput
elasticity ν is about
√
2; and (2) the productivity of skilled labor relative to
thatofunskilledlaborincreasedonaveragebyalmost12percentperyearover
theperiod.19 Moreinterestinglyforourpurposes, thewagepremiumﬁrstrose
during the 1960s, fell over the early 1970s, and ﬁnally rose sharply beginning
in the late 1970s. The latter increase continued unabated through the end of
the 1990s. What do these relative swings tell us about technology?
Weﬁrstobservethatalargerangeofdifferentdatasets(timeseriesaswell
as cross-section) and methods also yield an input elasticity of
√
2. This sug-
gests that assuming a stable production function with ν =
√
2 is reasonable,
and we can thus back out the entire sequence of factor-speciﬁc technology
ratios using the same methodology as in the example with investment-speciﬁc
technological change analyzed in Greenwood et al. (1997). For this data set,
one observes that (1) the overall increase of the wage premium is due to a rise
of the relative productivity of skilled labor As/Au, (2) the fall of the wage
premium in the early 1970s is due to the signiﬁcant increase of the relative
supply of skilled labor ns/nu, and (3) the relative productivity of skilled labor
started to rise sharply in the late 1970s.
The approach just described allows us to recover factor-speciﬁc produc-
tivities, conditional on assumptions about the relative factor substitutabilities.
In particular, it assumes that skilled and unskilled labor are equally substi-
tutablewithcapital. Goingbacktoawell-knownpaperbyGriliches(1969), it
has long been argued that most production technologies exhibit “capital-skill
complementarity.” That is, capital and skilled labor are more complementary
than are capital and unskilled labor.
19 In the wage regression, the coefﬁcient on the log of relative factor supplies represents
1/ν, that is ν = 1/0.71. Furthermore, if the relative productivity of skilled labor grows at the
rate (1+γ), (As/Au)t = (1+γ)(As/Au)t−1, then in the wage regression the coefﬁcient on time
represents ν − 1/ν log(1 + γ), that is γ ≈ .033 · ν/ν − 1.72 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Capital-Skill Complementarity
Krusell et al. (2000) argue that the higher wage premium is actually due to
capitalaccumulationsinceskilledlaborisrelativelymorecomplementarywith
capitalthanisunskilledlabor.20 Theycapturethedifferentialcomplementarity
betweencapitalandskilledandunskilledlaborusingthefollowingnestedCES
production technology
y = F [Aunu,G(k,Asns)],
where F and G are CES functions. This structure, unlike the one studied
in the previous section, allows capital-skill complementarity. If the factor
elasticity between capital and skilled labor is denoted µ, and that between
unskilled labor and either skilled labor or capital is denoted ν, then we have
capital-skill complementarity if µ<ν . Capital-skill complementarity means
that the relative wage will change when the capital stock changes, even if
labor inputs and labor-speciﬁc productivity levels do not change. Krusell et
al. (2000) show that with an estimate of µ in line with the ﬁndings from the
labor demand literature (see, for example, Hamermesh [1993]), a ν around √
2, and a measure of quality-adjusted capital, the relative wage movements
in the data can be quite closely tracked without any change in the relative
labor productivity As/Au.21 When Krusell et al. (2000) relax the assumption
of constant relative labor productivity, they ﬁnd that the relative productivity
of skilled labor grows at a modest 3 percent per year.
Notice how the results of Krusell et al. (2000) stand in sharp contrast to
theconclusionbasedonKatzandMurphy’s(1992)work. Whenrelativewage
changesaredrivenbychangesinrelativelaborproductivitiesalone,adifferent
capital accumulation behavior would have no effect on wages. On the other
hand, from the perspective of Krusell et al. (2000), there would have been no
rapidincreaseintheskillpremiuminrecentyearshaditnotbeenforthefaster
growth rate of capital. In sum, it appears plausible that equipment-speciﬁc
technologicalchange, possiblyaccompaniedbysomeadditional, independent
skill-biasedtechnologicalchangeunrelatedtoequipment,liesbehindthelarge
movements in relative wages of the last 30 years. That is, relative wage data
can be usefully employed to understand the nature and evolution of aggregate
technology in the economy.
20 Similar points, but in different theoretical structures, have been made in Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997) and Caselli (1999).
21 Krusell et al. (2000) emphasize the relative complementarities between equipment capital
and skilled and unskilled labor. The quality-adjusted equipment capital stock is again based on
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Factor-Speciﬁc Productivity and Relative Factor Endowments
Ourdiscussionoffactor-speciﬁcproductivitysofarhasassumedthatitevolves
exogenously. InarecentstudyCaselliandColeman(2000)applythemethods
of Krusell et al. (2000) to a cross section of countries. Some of their results
seemtosuggestthatcountrieschooseamongamenuofskilled-unskilledlabor
productivities and that these choices depend on the countries’ relative factor
endowments.
Caselli and Coleman (2000) obtain measures of capital and skilled- and
unskilled-labor input measures for a large cross section of countries. The au-
thors then assume marginal-product pricing and estimate a nested CES tech-
nology, which is common in form across countries. Given the estimated
CES parameters, they back out a set of factor-speciﬁc productivity levels, one
for each country. Although the results are preliminary as of this moment,
three interesting conclusions appear from our perspective. First, capital-skill
complementarity receives support. Second, countries appear to have very dif-
ferent mixes in factor-speciﬁc productivity levels. In particular, there seems
to be a negative correlation between As and Au in the cross section: Coun-
tries with high skilled-labor productivities tend to have low unskilled-labor
productivities and vice versa.22 This correlation suggests the existence of a
“productivity possibility frontier,” but the results also indicate that the choices
along the (As,A u) frontier still leave much to be explained: many countries
are signiﬁcantly inside the frontier and thus are operating inefﬁciently. Third,
countrieswithrelativelymoreskilledlabortendtohaverelativelyhighskilled
labor productivities and vice versa. This tendency suggests that a country’s
technology choice depends on its factor endowments, a point which has been
made by Acemoglu (see, for example, Acemoglu [2000] and Acemoglu and
Zilibotti [1998]).
3. A UNIFIED VIEW OF THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY?
What emerges from the sections on TFP and FSP measurement is a view of
technological change in the United States that is based on major improve-
ments in equipment production, with major effects on both aggregate and
factor-speciﬁc productivities. Several questions arise, however, regarding the
effects of TFP and FSP change. The ﬁrst of these relates to the productiv-
ity slowdown. Among the most signiﬁcant productivity movements over the
entire century is the large slowdown in TFP starting around 1973. Can the as-
sertedimprovementsinequipment-producingtechnologiesbemadeconsistent
22 It is an open question whether these ﬁndings are robust to better measurement of capital;
with appropriate quality adjustments, large differences can be observed in capital stocks, and the
capital-skill complementarity hypothesis then has implications for the factor-speciﬁc productivity
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with the productivity slowdown? Some recent papers advance the hypothe-
sis that learning problems associated with the use of the new equipment may
have been responsible for the aggregate slowdown.23 However, empirical as-
sessments of learning costs in implementing new technology are inherently
difﬁcult (see, for example, the recent arguments inAtkeson and Kehoe [2000]
and Hornstein [1999]) and we are far from being able to reach a conclusion
regarding this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the possibility remains an interesting
one.
Second, changes in technology are unlikely to occur only in the United
States; insights about the efﬁciency of different production methods, new
blueprints, and capital travel relatively easily across borders. Does interna-
tional data support the above productivity analysis? The European data tell
a different story about labor markets than the U.S. data. Whereas unemploy-
ment stayed low in the United States, it increased dramatically in Europe, and
European relative wages did not move nearly as much as U.S. relative wages.
However, the unemployment response in Europe occurred concurrently with
the relative wage response in the United States, so a common underlying
explanation should not be ruled out.
In particular, it seems quite plausible that differences in labor market in-
stitutions, and one common shock, can yield quite different responses in two
economies. Ourhypothesis,thus,isthatmoreheavilyregulatedandunionized
labor markets can make skill-biased technological change lead to increases in
the rate of unemployment instead of increases in the skill wage. This hy-
pothesis has been explored theoretically in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998),
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), and recently in Hornstein, Krusell, and Vi-
olante (2000).24 As labor market theory with frictions—allowing a nontrivial
role for unemployment—has not advanced as far quantitatively as has neo-
classical theory, it is too early yet for a ﬁrm evaluation of this hypothesis.
As for data on equipment relative prices, we do not know of European data
comparable to the U.S. data by Gordon (1990) on the more recent revisions
forsomeequipmentcategoriesintheNIPA.Improvementsinequipmentprice
measurement should, in our view, be placed high on the agenda in the United
States and even higher in Europe.
A uniﬁed view of the macroeconomic productivity and labor market per-
formances during the last quarter century in the western world is a very inter-
estingonethatoughttobeexploredinmuchfurtherdetail. Itcanbeviewedas
a “third industrial revolution,” placing advanced equipment and IT on center
stage. We believe that careful reassessments of input and output measure-
ments, together with theory developments aimed at structural evaluation of
the main hypothesis, would be most productive.
23 See, for example, Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997).
24 Related work, focusing more on wages than on unemployment, is found in Violante (1999)
and Aghion, Howitt, and Violante (1999).A. Hornstein, P. Krusell: IT Revolution 75
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